Well I just got done Translate and got this I cant say if its right or not lol.
The moon, More allied that the night illuminates. Humans, Enemy that the day colludes. The life, Femaleness those the cosmos with lives fertilizes. The feeling, Subjektivierung of a thought. The reality perception - A mirror during negative conviction the reality distorts, breaks. It is not easy, the life is heavy; the life weight is crushing! Entzückend? Yes! Entzückend to all those loving gladly suffer. I do not suffer gladly. Ungratefully, I am on the escape before my birthday gift. Where you were before this life, as you did not exist yet? And now are you here, in another dimension, welcomely in the material physical reality. You will leave it, if you go again there back, where you were, before you lived. You know death thus. There you were. Everyone was that. The night beschattet our dreams, during the shade of the feeler gauge the duality of the universe, as basis of the espionage for clearing-up and acquisition of strange secrets attains. The sky opens, dark clouds make for place because it my birth will introduce, not today and not yesterday and tomorrow just as few. Garbage cans from honey, radiate like laughing children on the road, and the Ghettos of dark homeland forces the cry after love, back into the sky and highly to the stars, I cry each night rain on humans back and expire its fires as cloud of the cried mourning.
Thank you very much for your work. It´s done good, but the problem is that in german a word could mean a thought you can´t write that easy way in english, so in english you need to write more, maybe. In germany we have the word denotation. Her I gave you a link, sorry, but it´s that complicated!
http://www.arthist.lu.se/kultsem/encyclo/denotation_connotation.html
Denotation/Connotation
As used in semiotics and in neighbouring disciplines, the terms denotation and connotation really cover at least four main conceptual distinctions, some of which have several varieties: yet, ignoring a few marginal cases, all may be seen as different ways of carving up a particular semantic domain, made up of the two obligatory relata of the sign function, expression and content, and of a portion of the experimental world corresponding to the content, viz. the referent. Consistent with the views of Saussure and Hjelmslev, the content is here considered to be a mental, or more precisely, an intersubjective, entity, whereas the referent is taken to be something which may be encountered in the experimental world, that is, at least potentially, in direct perception. Given these preliminaries, the four different distinctions can be adequately derived, but unlike the terms, the resulting concepts do not exclude each other, and in fact are often confused in the literature.
In the case of the logical distinction, the connotation is identical with the content, or with a particular feature analysis of the content, and the denotation is another name for the referent, or for the relation connecting the content to the referent or, in some conceptions, starting out directly from the expression.
In what we shall henceforth call the stylistic distinction, denotation is considered to be a part of the content that is taken to be in one-to-one correspondence with the referent, and connotation is identified with what remains of the content when denotation is deducted; at the same time, however, connotation and denotation are ordinarily supposed to be different kinds of content, where the possible content categories are defined by psychological predicates. Moreover, in some versions of the distinction, the semantic domain subject to segmentation is extended on the side termed connotation, so as to include also the subjective mental content of the sender and/or receiver of the sign, without the latter being clearly distinguished from the marginal content domain of the sign.
The semiotical distinction, so called because it is proper to semiotics, viz. to the Hjelmslev tradition, concerns a denotation which is a relation between the expression and the content, and a connotation which relates two signs (i.e. two units of expression and content) in a particular way.
Finally, what Eco calls connotation, when he is not simply thinking about the stylistic notion, is really what is elsewhere termed a (contextual) implication, i.e. the distinction is this time concerned with the differing degrees of indirectness with which the content is given, denotation being merely the less indirect one.
The logical distinction:
In logic and philosophy, denotation means the same thing as extension, i.e. the object or class of objects subsumed by a concept, and connotation is another term for what is also termed intension or comprehension, i.e. the list of all properties characterising the concept, or only those properties conceived to be the necessary and sufficient criteria for ascribing some objet to the concept; and/or the properties permitting us to pick out the objects falling under the concept. Employing the latter terms, the Logic of Port Royal first (in 1662) introduced this distinction, whereas the usage involving the terms denotation and connotation probably derives from John Stuart Mill (cf. Garza Cuarón 1987; 57ff, 69ff).
Intension and extension are sometimes identified with what Frege termed "Sinn" and "Bedeutung", which means that various intensions may correspond to a single extension: for instance, "the Morning Star" and "the Evening Star", "equilateral triangle" and "equiangular triangle", "the vanquisher of Austerlitz" and "the vanquished of Waterloo", etc., have the same extensions but different intensions. If the intension is taken to contain all properties common to the objects in the extension, then, as Kubczak (1975:73) rightly observes, all terms having the same extension will also have the same intension. For instance, both the Morning Star and the Evening Star could be described as "a particular star, which can be seen shortly before the rising and shortly before the setting of the sun". If this is indeed the content of both terms, it is difficult to explain the fact that, in many contexts, one of the terms cannot be exchanged for the other. Kubczak concludes that, in linguistic signs, intensions do not contain full information about the objects referred to.
An alternative explanation was long ago suggested by Edmund Husserl, and spelled out in further detail by Aron Gurwitsch (1957: 145ff): according to this analysis, the conceptual noema, i.e. the intension, does in fact contain all elements found in the object, but each time organised into a particular thematic hierarchy. If this is so, then it might be argued that terms lacking substitutability in "opaque contexts" contain the same features, but differently arranged (Sonesson 1978). Thus, to use Humboldt’s classical example, quoted by Kubzcak (p140), the Elephant may be conceived of as "der zweimal Trinkende", "der Zweizahnige", or "der mit einer Hand Versehene", each time giving pre-eminence to one of the proper parts or attributes of the whole.
The stylistic distinction
The stylistic distinction also takes it origin in the Port Royal Logic, where connotation, in this sense, is termed "idées accessoires"; it was, however, the German grammarian Karl Otto Erdmann, who in 1900 distinguished between "Hauptbedeutung", "Nebensinn", and "Gefühlswert", and Urban, Firth, and Ogden & Richards, seem to be among those principally responsible for circulating these notions in the English-speaking world, translating the first term by "denotation", and conflating the latter two terms under the denomination "connotation" (cf. Garza Cuarón 1978: 62ff; Rössler 1979:1f). Erdmann apparently thought that the core meaning, which he believed to be conceptual in nature, could be distinguished from subsidiary meaning aspects, on one hand, and from emotional values and ambience, on the other, but as the distinction is nowadays stated, the latter two notions are amalgamated.
According to this conception, a demarcated portion of the content domain corresponds point by point to an object in the perceptual world, such as it would appear in a completely "objective" account; whereas the other part, the residue, has no equivalent in the real-world object, but is added to the content by the sign and/or the sign user. The features of the first part are supposed to be cognitive or conceptual, thus permitting the identification of the real-world object; the features of the other part are said to be emotive, or emotional, and it is never made clear whether they are part of the intersubjective content of the sign, are contributed by the sign producer, or result form the reaction of the sign receiver. Moreover, the cognitive meaning is taken to be more important than the rest, perhaps because cognition is postulated to carry more importance than emotion.
It is not obvious that all these properties must necessarily co-occur. For instance, the most important features of the meaning of such as word as "darling", and those which permit an identification, are emotional, in the sense that they describe the emotional relationship between the speaker and the object referred to, the emotion being codified as a part of the intersubjective content of the language sign (Cf. Sonesson 1978). Although this variety of the terminological distinction is thus the most difficult to uphold, it remains the most popular one, and is often confused with the other ones, even in semiotical texts (thus for instance by Barthes).
